Implementation of Project Management Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2250 words

Implementation of Project Management - Essay Example Founded essentially as an automotive component manufacturer, the company started manufacturing electronic components for the military during the Gulf war. Soon after the Gulf war the company emerged a major component supplier for the space programme and when that business segment did not grow well, the company embarked upon the production of various other items relating to energy management, building products and machine tools in addition to automotive components. With a turnover of $ 600 million, the automotive components manufacture remained the major business activity of Hyten Corporation. The coordination of any new project or a new product from concept to market is the responsibility the ‘Business Development Department’ started to substitute the non-existent project management department. The business development department was taking decisions on the undertaking of any new products or services in a crude way based on macro factors like economic and industry indica tors without really going into the other details of the product or service. The activities of the department were conducted through informal meetings of the functional directors and the manpower for the department was met with people both from within and outside the organisation. With a view to redefine the functions of the business development department as a full fledged project management department Wilbur Donley, with five years experience as a project manager was hired by Hyten Corporation. When the process of establishing the formal project department in Hyten Corporation, there were different ideas and views expressed by the various departments of the company about the implementation of the project management which are summarized below: 3.0 General Observations on the Introduction of Project Management in Hyten Corporation: As a result of the discussion between Wilbur Donley, the project manager, Frank Harrel, the Manger for quality and reliability and George Hub, the Manager of manufacturing engineering the following points about the integration of formal project management in Hytel Corporation emerged: Presently due to lack of coordination among different departments, the marketing and manufacturing departments do not understand and appreciate the functions of the quality department

Free

Free Will and Moral Responsibility Essay This collection of essays has its roots in a conference on free will and moral responsibility held at Monash University in November 2005, though only a few of the papers presented at the conference have made it into the current volume. We would like to thank both the participants at this conference and the contributors to this volume, as well as Cambridge Scholars Publishing for inviting us to put the collection together. Grateful acknowledgement is also made to the editor of the online journal, Sorites, where Nick Trakakis’ paper, â€Å"Whither Morality in a Hard Determinist World? †, was originally published (in vol. 19, December 2007). Finally, thanks to Shannon Weekes for her assistance in compiling the Index. INTRODUCTION NICK TRAKAKIS AND DANIEL COHEN Much of the interest of the free will debate depends on the assumption that free will is necessary for moral responsibility. In particular, it is because responsibility seems so important for our practical lives that debates about the compatibility of free will and determinism seem so urgent. However, much of the discussion in this volume bypasses this link. Instead, questions are raised that directly concern responsibility, such as whether it is compatible with determinism (see, for example, the essays by Fischer, Widerker, and Pereboom) and whether it is compatible with indeterminism (for example, the exchange between Levy and Kane). For the purposes of this introduction, we have not attempted to summarize the various ways in which the contributors construe the metaphysical foundations of moral responsibility. Instead, we wish to address a more preliminary matter. In the first part of this introduction, our aim is to say something about what we mean when we say that someone is morally responsible. It is surely important to clarify this before addressing any further substantive issues because, if we don’t clarify the meaning of this key term, there remains a significant danger that different participants in the debate about the possibility of moral responsibility will simply ‘talk past each other’. This suggests that in order to conduct a fruitful debate participants need firstly to agree on the nature of their subject-matter and, perhaps, to disambiguate different dimensions of the debate that arise if the term ‘moral responsibility’ has different connotations. In the second part of the introduction, we will discuss a neglected Wittgensteinian perspective on the notions of freedom and responsibility, a perspective that may help to clarify some of the confusion that arises when we ask what it means to say that a person is free or responsible. 1. The Meaning of Responsibility. Before proceeding to ask whether people are, in fact, ever morally responsible, it seems that an important preliminary matter needs to be settled. That is, we need to ask what we mean when we say that a person is x Introduction morally responsible. As will quickly become clear, settling this preliminary matter is, in fact, much harder than it first seems. Many of the controversies concerning the possibility of responsibility emerge even when we try to say just what ‘responsibility’ means. Let’s start with a claim that seems relatively uncontroversial. We will simply assume that ‘person A is responsible’ is a normative claim. That is to say, it is a claim to the effect that it is appropriate to hold A responsible in certain circumstances (circumstances, for example, where A has acted wrongly and where no mitigating, justifying, or excusing factors are present). However, this account of the meaning of ‘A is responsible’ raises at least two further issues. Firstly, we need to say more about what it means to hold someone responsible and, secondly, we need to say more about the nature and basis of the norms that govern appropriate responsibility attribution. It is important to keep in mind that our goal, in clarifying these two questions, should not be to settle any question regarding whether people are, in fact, ever morally responsible. Rather, we want to settle the terms of this debate before it begins. To this extent, we need sufficiently neutral accounts both of the nature of responsibility attribution and of its normative basis so that we don’t beg any substantive questions before debate has even begun. As we will try to show, however, this is a rather elusive goal. The only neutral account of the nature of responsibility attribution renders the normative question deeply controversial. And the only neutral account of the normative basis of responsibility attribution renders the nature of responsibility attribution deeply controversial. Holding Responsible There appear to be two plausible contending views regarding the nature of responsibility attribution. On cognitivist accounts, holding A responsible fundamentally involves believing something to be true of A, while on noncognitivist accounts, holding A responsible essentially involves holding some conative attitude towards A. (Cognitivists may, of course, argue that responsibility attribution is also usually associated with some conative attitude. However, they will maintain that it is possible to hold someone responsible without holding such conative attitudes. Similarly for noncognitivist accounts, mutatis mutandis. ) Non-cognitivism appears to provide the most successful neutral basis on which to premise the debate concerning the possibility of responsibility. This is because there seems little room for debate concerning the conative attitudes that characterize normal responsibility Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen xi attribution. In particular, few would disagree that responsibility attribution is strongly associated with the ‘reactive attitudes’ identified by P. F. Strawson, i. e. , resentment, indignation, anger and so on. 1 If one wishes to argue, however, that the reactive attitudes, while prevalent, are inessential to responsibility attribution, it is much harder to locate any common ground concerning the beliefs that are essential to responsibility attribution. One may suggest, for instance, that to hold A responsible is to believe that she is the source of some bad behaviour. Deep controversies quickly emerge on this view, however. One might take sourcehood to involve a psychological claim, for instance that A ‘really wanted’ to act wrongly. 2 However, others might object that any such glib psychological account fails to explain why it is fair to blame A for the wrongdoing (see Smilansky’s contribution). One might object, in this vein, that any such psychological story is unable to show that an agent really is the source of her having certain desires or values (see McKenna’s contribution), and that sourcehood thus requires some more obscure metaphysical basis (e. g. , agent-causation). Alternatively, one may suggest that sourcehood involves some impossible requirement such as that an agent was self-created. 3 On this view, holding someone responsible is essentially impossible. 4 Our goal is to account for the meaning of responsibility in neutral terms so as to provide a basis for constructive debate about the conditions (and the very possibility) of responsibility. It appears, however, that the cognitivist view of responsibility attribution quickly leads to debates that already beg these important questions before debate has even begun! This suggests that the best theory-neutral account of the meaning of responsibility must explain holding responsible in non-cognitivist terms. The Normative Basis of Responsibility Attribution Recall that, for the purposes of this discussion, we have assumed a normative account of responsibility according to which ‘A is responsible’ means ‘it is appropriate to hold A responsible in certain conditions’. Having addressed how best to interpret what ‘holding A responsible’ might mean, without begging any important questions, we need now to turn to a second question raised by the normative account: when exactly is it appropriate to hold someone responsible? In other words, what are the norms that govern appropriate responsibility attribution? Again, there are two plausible contending views: appropriateness may be explained either in terms of practical norms (taking ‘holding responsible’ to be analogous xii Introduction to the performance of an action) or by way of doxastic norms (taking ‘holding responsible’ to be analogous to the formation of a belief). Again, only on one of these accounts—the doxastic view—is it possible to offer an appropriately uncontroversial explanation of the norms implicit in responsibility attribution. On the doxastic view, one ought to hold A responsible if and only if it is true that A is responsible. On this view, the normative basis of responsibility attribution straightforwardly derives from the normativity of belief. It is clear that the doxastic account presupposes the cognitivist view discussed earlier, according to which holding A responsible involves believing something about her. Given this view of the nature of responsibility attribution, the normative question— concerning when responsibility attribution is appropriate—has a straightforward answer. Unfortunately, as we saw, there is no uncontroversial way to account for the truth-conditions of ‘A is responsible’, on the cognitivist assumption that it involves belief. So, despite the advantages of the doxastic view in providing a neutral account of the normative basis of responsibility attribution, this view at the same time precludes us from obtaining a neutral view regarding the nature of responsibility attribution (i. e. , the truth-conditions for the belief that A is responsible. ) Might we find an account of the normative basis of responsibility attribution that is consistent with the preferable non-cognitivist view outlined earlier? This would have to involve an alternative view, according to which responsibility attribution is justified in virtue of practical norms. However, if responsibility attribution is governed by practical norms, then things are much less straightforward. One may suggest that the relevant practical norms are just moral norms, so that ‘A is responsible’ states something like: ‘It is morally obligatory (or, perhaps, permissible) to hold A responsible’. This view may appear immediately problematic because the appropriateness of responsibility attribution will now depend on further questions that are deeply controversial (for instance, questions concerning the debate between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism; see Vargas’ contribution). A more fundamental worry arises concerning the methodological appropriateness of appealing to moral norms. One may argue, for instance, that the nature of moral obligation, itself, depends on the foundations of responsibility, which is, of course, the question at issue. Haji (in his contribution) argues that the best metaphysical basis of responsibility (i. e. , event-causal libertarianism) renders moral obligation essentially lucky. This suggests that there would be something viciously circular in explaining the meaning of responsibility Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen xiii in terms of some claim about our moral obligations. (See also Trakakis’ contribution. ) To avoid these worries, one may appeal to practical norms that appear to be more fundamental than any particular moral system. For instance, R. J. Wallace offers a normative account of responsibility that appeals to fairness. 5 This is meant to provide a normative basis for responsibility that remains neutral on more substantive moral issues. (See also Smilansky’s contribution. ) Clearly, however, appealing to practical norms launches us into further debates that already beg the question at issue. Again, such an account seems ill-suited for the purpose of setting up a neutral definitional framework on which to premise further debate. A Dilemma Our aim has been to find some neutral definition of responsibility to enable further non-question-begging debates about the possibility and conditions of responsibility. It seems that this goal gives rise to a tricky dilemma. The best theory-neutral account of holding responsible is the non-cognitivist account. However, this account appears incompatible with the best theory-neutral account of the norms that govern responsibility attribution—the doxastic account. The doxastic account, in turn, seems compatible only with the most problematic account of holding responsible—the cognitivist account. This is a puzzling result. Even though responsibility clearly gives rise to very complex issues, it is surprising that it is not possible even to define the terms of the debate without deep controversy. The worry thus remains that debates about the possibility and conditions of responsibility are essentially question-begging, insofar as different participants to the debate conceive of its key terms differently. Must we conclude, then, that different people and different theorists are indeed talking past each other when they debate about the possibility of responsible action? This, of course, would be a depressingly deflationist conclusion. There is a possible way out, however, that is rarely canvassed. If the question concerns the meaning of ‘responsibility’, one might suggest that there are, perhaps, other ways to settle things. In particular, isn’t the meaning of a term determined by our use of the term? (Or, at least, isn’t use a good guide to meaning?) Thus, appeal to real-world attributions of responsibility may illuminate the meaning of the term ‘responsible’. Such a methodology is sometimes rejected on the grounds that real-world attributions are rife with internal inconsistency (see, for example, Cohen xiv Introduction and Saling’s contribution). But perhaps a closer look at the Wittgensteinian ‘solution’ to the problem of freedom and responsibility will throw new light on the matter. 2. Making Sense of Free Will: A Wittgensteinian Account Wittgenstein published very little during his lifetime, and even less on the topic of free will. He does, however, make some pertinent remarks in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that mirror in some respects the contemporary debates on free will. As is well known, the early Wittgenstein claims to have definitively solved the central problems of philosophy, and by implication this would include the perennial problem of free will. Wittgenstein’s strategy proceeds by separating sense from nonsense. The realm of sense is delimited in the light of his picture theory of meaning, according to which a proposition is meaningful (or capable of expressing a fact) only if it can represent or picture a contingent state of affairs. What cannot thus be represented is consigned to silence, or as Wittgenstein famously put it at the conclusion of his book, â€Å"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence† (proposition 7). 6 In the course of the book, however, it soon becomes clear that what can be meaningfully said are only the propositions of natural science, thereby leaving out of the realm of sense a daunting number of statements which are regularly made and used in language, including the propositions of logic, aesthetics, religion, and (most relevant for our purposes here) traditional metaphysics and ethics. But unlike the positivists, Wittgenstein does not assume that what is nonsensical is of no value. As he stated in a letter to a prospective publisher, Ludwig von Ficker: â€Å"My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. †7 Further, ethical and metaphysical truths that cannot be ‘said’ or formulated in sayable (sensical) propositions can nonetheless be ‘shown’: â€Å"There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical† (6. 522). In line with this austere outlook, Wittgenstein hints in the Tractatus that the very concepts at issue in the free will debate—concepts such as ‘freedom’ and ‘responsibility’—cannot be meaningfully expressed. Although in propositions 5. 1361 (â€Å"We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present†) and 5. 1362 (â€Å"The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future†) he seems to reject determinism as false and to accept freedom of the will as true, rather than rejecting both as nonsensical, here we arguably have a Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen xv minimalist conception of free will as nothing more than ignorance or uncertainty regarding the future, as opposed to a substantive commitment to the metaphysical idea of a ‘will’ that could be free or unfree. This is confirmed in later passages where Wittgenstein takes the law of causality—the principle that every event has a cause—to be â€Å"not a law but the form of a law† (6. 32), adding a few propositions later that, â€Å"If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are laws of nature. But of course that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest† (6. 36). The law of causality, in other words, is not itself a law of logic nor a law of nature (or an empirical generalization), nor a synthetic a priori proposition, but rather â€Å"something purely logical† (6. 3211), a vacuous principle that tells us, not something about the world, but only something about the form our thinking about the world must take. But what is formal, according to the Tractatus, can only be shown, not said. On this view, then, the law of causality, and by extension any substantial or metaphysical doctrine of determinism, cannot be affirmed or denied, but must be placed in the category of ineffability or nonsense. Similarly, the denial of determinism—viz. , indeterminism—is bound to result in nonsense. At one stroke, then, Wittgenstein seems to have dissolved the free will problem. Contemporary discussions of free will often take a similar turn. For example, concepts such as ‘free will’ and ‘moral responsibility’ are routinely rejected as internally incoherent or contradictory, or as incompatible with determinism or indeterminism (or both), and like the early Wittgenstein this result is achieved simply through a kind of armchair or a priori reflection on the conditions of possibility of free will and responsibility. A glaring instance of this is Galen Strawson’s ‘pessimist’ conclusion that free will, of the sort that is necessary for genuine moral responsibility, is impossible, for in order to have that kind of free will (according to Strawson) one would per impossible have to be the ultimate cause or origin of oneself, a sort of causa sui. But what is neglected in this procedure is attention to particulars, to the variety of ways in which concepts such as free will and responsibility function in different discourses and social practices. This, of course, is the message of the ‘later Wittgenstein’, the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations8, which effects a fundamental change of perspective: from the realm of an idealized logical language with rigorous definitions and analyses to the vagaries of everyday life and action out of which arise the multifarious ‘language games’. The earlier reduction of language to representation is now seen as incapable of doing justice to the rich fabric of human language, and so xvi Introduction Wittgenstein famously moves from a conception of meaning as representation to a view of meaning as use: language as a kind of doing rather than a kind of picturing. We are therefore exhorted to â€Å"look and see† (PI 66) whether there is anything in common in the variety of uses to which a word is put. We cannot simply assume that words like ‘freedom’ and ‘responsibility’ must have a hidden essence, or a universally applicable meaning that can be formulated in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, we need to look to the complicated network of overlapping and criss-crossing similarities—what Wittgenstein calls ‘family resemblances’—between various words as these find expression in ordinary life and in various language games. Each language game, however, has its own unique ‘grammar’ (or network of rules which determine what linguistic or conceptual moves are allowed as making sense) and its own criteria of truth, rationality and intelligibility which may or may not be shared by other language games. What counts as freedom of the will may therefore differ widely depending on which language game is being played: freedom, for some religious believers, requires the extinction of one’s will, while for purposes of legislation freedom may be conceived of as requiring a significant degree of self-determination. Underlying this view is the rejection of the mathematical ideal of the Tractatus, typified by statements that are put forward as impersonal, unambiguous and impervious to context, and whose truth is intended to be timeless and without qualification. Language, for the later Wittgenstein, is a much more dynamic, diversified and activity-oriented phenomenon. And to be faithful to the richness and complexity of this phenomenon demands an appreciation of the bewildering and sometimes conflicting ways in which words and concepts—‘free will’ and ‘responsibility’ included—are used. It may be instructive to briefly compare (the later) Wittgenstein’s treatment of religious belief with his remarks on free will and voluntary action. Consider, for example, how Wittgenstein, in his â€Å"Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough†, responds to the phenomenon of religious diversity, to the fact that different religions seem to say different and incompatible things about (e. g. ) the nature of divine or ultimate reality and the nature and destiny of the human race: Was Augustine in error, then, when he called upon God on every page of the Confessions? But—one might say—if he was not in error, surely the Buddhist holy man was—or anyone else—whose religion gives expression to completely different views. But none of them was in error, except when he set forth a theory. 9 Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen xvii Against philosophers and anthropologists like James George Frazer, who construe religious doctrines as hypotheses or theories that can be confirmed or disconfirmed in light of empirical evidence, Wittgenstein views each religion as embodying a unique form of life that finds expression in language games whose ‘rules’ (relating to truth, rationality, intelligibility, and so on) may diverge quite dramatically from those of science. On this view, the various religions of the world are not in the business of constructing hypotheses and searching for evidence, and so they are not in competition with one another, at least in the way that scientific theories may vie for the mantle of verisimilitude. The problem of religious diversity is therefore dissolved. No language game, religious or otherwise, has a monopoly on truth and on the meaning of ‘truth’. Wittgenstein is thus opposed to both the religious exclusivist, who maintains that there is one religion which is privileged with respect to truth and soteriological effectiveness, and the scientistic philosopher who argues that the methods and techniques of science (perhaps construed broadly enough to include philosophy and logic) are our only reliable guide to truth. Instead, Wittgenstein places all language games on an equal footing, allowing a thousand flowers to bloom. Thus, as David Pears has perceptively pointed out, Wittgenstein’s later work has †¦an extraordinary levelling effect. It does not assimilate one kind of discourse to another: on the contrary, it is always the differences between them that are emphasized, and particularly the difference between factual discourse and the other kinds. But it does bring all the great philosophical questions which arise within them back to the same level, ordinary human life, from which philosophy started. Philosophy is the voyage out, and the voyage back, both of which are necessary if the logical space of our ordinary linguistic practices is to be understood. 10 One of these ‘great philosophical questions’ is, of course, the question of free will and moral responsibility. On this matter, as with questions to do with religious faith, Wittgenstein refused the dominance of science on modern thinking: rather than constructing systematic theories that dictate from ‘on high’—inevitably from a position that holds up science as the model for all other discourses—how the phenomena in question are to be understood, we are brought back time and again to particular facts and examples rooted in everyday language and practices. Taking such an approach to free will can produce startling results. For one thing, the belief in free will begins to look more like a religious commitment than a theoretical or scientific belief. Wittgenstein’s Kierkegaardian (or, more pejoratively, fideistic) account of religious belief is well known: xviii Introduction It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation. 11 But his somewhat similar account of free will has received less attention, despite the ever-expanding publishing industry on free will: In the sense in which asking a question and insisting on an answer is expressive of a different attitude, a different mode of life, from not asking it, the same can be said of utterances like â€Å"It is God’s will† or â€Å"We are not masters of our fate†. The work done by this sentence, or at any rate something like it, could also be done by a command! Including one which you give yourself. 12 Life is like a path along a mountain ridge; to left and right are slippery slopes down which you slide without being able to stop yourself, in one direction or the other. I keep seeing people slip like this and I say â€Å"How could a man help himself in such a situation! † And that is what â€Å"denying free will† comes to. That is the attitude expressed in this ‘belief’. But it is not a scientific belief and has nothing to do with scientific convictions. 13 Thus, belief in free will, much like religious belief, does not purport to express an empirical fact, but is rather expressive of an attitude, a mode of life, an imperative to live in a certain way. In the two lectures he delivered at Cambridge on freedom of the will, Wittgenstein went on to characterize belief in free will as ‘groundless’, as not supported by evidence or arguments14, again indicating parallels with religious faith. To better appreciate this view of free will, one might introduce certain ideas from the Philosophical Investigations and, especially, On Certainty. 15 In the former work, Wittgenstein speaks of our beliefs as founded upon a ‘bedrock’ certainty: â€Å"If I have exhausted the justifications [for following a rule] I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do’† (PI 217). Similarly, in OC 341 Wittgenstein states, â€Å"the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn† (cf. OC 88). Although Wittgenstein refers here to propositions as acting as hinges, it is commonly thought that in the more mature phase of his epistemological work Wittgenstein thought of practices rather than propositions as primary. This, then, is no traditional foundationalism, where an inferential relationship is thought to obtain between the set of beliefs that comprise the foundations and the other beliefs we hold, with the former justifying the latter. Instead, for Wittgenstein what lies at the bottom or at the foundations of our language Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen xix games are not specific beliefs or propositions, but ‘ungrounded ways of acting’ (OC 110, 204), ‘communal practices’ (OC 128, 298), and ‘forms of life’ (OC 7, 358). It is in this spirit that Wittgenstein quotes from Goethe’s Faust: â€Å"In the beginning was the deed† (OC 402). Nonetheless, our practices and forms of life can be said to show or manifest the beliefs (or quasi-beliefs) and assumptions upon which we base our lives, including such beliefs as ‘I have two hands’ and ‘The world has existed for more than 10 minutes’. However, in opposition to G. E. Moore, Wittgenstein describes these as ‘certainties’ rather than ‘knowledge-claims’, for they are not grounded in evidence or open to verification, but express an attitude and a way of acting, and so are not true or false, reasonable or unreasonable, but simply â€Å"there—like our life† (OC 559, cf. 162, 205). It would be arguably in keeping with this epistemological account, in conjunction with the later Wittgenstein’s remarks on free will, to say that belief in free will (and moral responsibility) may also function, at least in some contexts, as one of the bedrock certainties, as one of the things that ‘stand fast for us’ in our actions and practices (cf. OC 116), or as the framework within which our ethical practices operate and are made intelligible. There are close parallels here with existentialist philosophy, where to exist as a human being and to be free (almost) come to the same thing. Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, famously stated that we are ‘condemned’ to freedom, not free not to be free. In a similar vein, the Russian religious existentialist Nikolai Berdiaev, dubbed ‘the philosopher of freedom’, eschewed traditional accounts of freedom, which treat free will as an object that could somehow be perceived, investigated and proved or disproved from the outside, and adopted instead the Kantian position that freedom is a postulate of action: it is something we must presuppose to even think of a world in which human life and human agency are possible. Wittgenstein would have been sympathetic to this outlook, for like the existentialists he is primarily concerned with concrete social and linguistic practices and seeks to provide a philosophical understanding of human existence that is not restricted to the explanatory framework of science (or even that of much traditional philosophy). For Wittgenstein, therefore, belief in free will, just as much as belief in God, is not threatened by scientific discoveries: â€Å"we couldn’t say now ‘If they discover so and so, then I’ll say I am free’. †16 In line with this view, Wittgenstein spends some time in his lectures on freedom of the will in attempting to show that even if a deterministic account of the world were demanded by our best scientific theories, belief in free will need not be affected at all. 17 But he is not thereby putting forward a case for compatibilism: â€Å"All these arguments xx Introduction might look as if I wanted to argue for the freedom of the will or against it. But I don’t want to. †18 Wittgenstein does not follow the traditional course of attempting to resolve the free will problem by proving one position or refuting another. His aim, as with other traditional philosophical problems, is to expose the problem as some kind of deep muddle or confusion arising largely from misunderstandings of the workings of language. One recurrent criticism of this view is that it appears to render the language games of science, religion, and ethics entirely self-contained and cut off from each other, if not also immune from criticism from ‘without’. This, indeed, is a common misconception of the Wittgensteinian account of religion, and in response Wittgensteinians such as D. Z. Phillips have emphasized the many important connections between religious and nonreligious forms of life which (it is held) must be recognized if religious belief is not to degenerate into superstition. Similarly, Wittgenstein points out that scientific discoveries may have a bearing on ascriptions of free will: â€Å"A discovery might influence what you say on the freedom of the will. If only by directing your attention in a particular way. †19 But despite these connections between the scientific and non-scientific domains, Wittgenstein insists that the distinctiveness of each language game must not be overlooked. In particular, the languages of ethics and religion must not be assimilated to the kind of fact-stating discourse and fact-finding activities that characterize the empirical sciences.

The Impact Of The Typewriter History Essay

The Impact Of The Typewriter History Essay The typewriter was one of the greatest turning points in history. Writing, a previously laborious task, was made immensely easier. The typewriter benefited countless businessmen, researchers, and professionals who were all obliged to undergo the drudgery of the pen.  [1]  It brought convenience and productivity to people everywhere. Even more important, however, was its impact on businesses and society. Companies were grew and expanded in unparalleled ways because of this newfound speed in writing. Because of the speed of writing the Sholes-Glidden typewriter brought to the table, the typewriter became the driving force in nearly every companys growth. The Sholes-Glidden typewriter, however, was not the first typewriter to be made, nor was it the first to be faster than hand-writing-it was simply the first commercially successful typewriter. In order to trace the roots of the typewriter, one must go back several centuries to a time long before keyboards. Writing had been a long, tedious process since its creation. Words and symbols had to be meticulously copied by hand, stroke-for-stroke, word-for-word, again and again in order to make a single copy or write down a single record. In fact, the writing process was so arduous that there were people-scribes-whose lives were dedicated just to writing and copying. They were honored and renowned, too, just because of how difficult writing was. Despite the difficulty, however, writing was an integral part of human progression. By the 1400s, people had already gotten tired of writings difficulty and looked for new ways to reduce this labor. The result was the printing press, the first invention that revolutionized the world of writing.  [2]  Following this success, humans began seeking for even more ways to improve writing and make it easier. The next major revolution in writing came in the mid-1600s in the form of William Pettys writing machine. In the machines patent, Charles I describe d it as a machine that: à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦might be learnt in an hours time, and of great advantage to lawyers, scriveners, merchants, scholars, registars, clerks, etcetera; it saving the labour of examination, discovering or preventing falsification, and performing the business of writing-as with ease and speed-so with privacy.  [3]   In essence, Pettys invention was really just a machine that wrote with two pens at once. However, Charles Is description could also be applied to the typewriter perfectly. In 1714, nearly sixty years later, Henry Mill created the next notable typewriter. In the patent granted to him by the Queen, Mills typewriter was described as: an artificial machine or method for impressing or transcribing of letters, singly or progressively one after the other, as in writing, whereby all writings whatsoever may be engrossed on paper or parchment so neat and exact as not to be distinguished from printà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦the impression being deeper and more lasting than any other writing  [4]   Unlike Pettys two-pen writing machine, Mills machine was much more similar to the 20th century typewriter. In just sixty years since the first notable typewriter, tremendous progress had already been achieved on the journey to creating writings most revolutionizing invention. Invented in 1829, William Austin Burts Typographer became the first American writing machine.  [5]  A person would type on Burts Typographer by spinning a large wheel with many characters on it until his/her desired character was in front of the typing point. Next, a hammer would bring the type to the surface of the paper, creating a character on the paper. This, however, was a very slow process-even slower than hand-writing. It was also very prone to spelling errors, as proved in a letter he wrote to his wife.  [6]  Despite its flaws, many people saw potential in the machine. One such person was John Sheldon, the editor of the Michigan Gazette. He was so impressed with the typewriter, in fact, that he even went so far as to write to Andrew Jackson, the president at the time. However, Sheldon was not able to come up with enough funds to manufacture the Typographer, and the typographer was brought to a premature end. Much like Charles I and the Queens descriptions of previous typewriters, Sheldons letter was meant to predict the impact of Burts Typographer, but instead managed to better predict the eventual outcome of the typewriter. In his letter, Sheldon wrote that the writing machine will be ranked with the most novel, useful, and pleasing inventions of this age.  [7]  Following Burt, many inventors tried to create their own typing machines-but none of them were nearly as progressive as Burts.  [8]  These later typewriters were not really able to impact the world or garner as much attention as Burts, and, as a result, their inventors names and faces became lost in the depths of history. In 1831, the next notable typewriter emerged, born into a time of great conflict within America herself. Originally built as a hobby by John Pratt, the Pterotype would eventually become the inspiration for the first commercially successful typewriter.  [9]  Because taking out a patent was very hard during the Civil War, Pratt decided to finish his machine in London, where he was able to obtain a British patent in 1864. His Pterotype aroused much interest and speculation in many English citizens.  [10]  In fact, the machine was so profound that when Pratt returned to America at the end of the Civil War, he found an editorial, Type Writing Machine, written in Scientific American that described his machine as A machine by which it is assumed that a man may print his thoughts twice as fast as he can write them, and with the advantage of the legibility, compactness and neatness of print, has lately been exhibited before the London Society of Arts by the inventor, Mr. Prattà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦The subject of typewriting is one of the interesting aspects of the near future. Its manifest feasibility and advantage indicate that the laborious and unsatisfactory performance of the pen must, sooner or later, become obsolete for general purposes.  [11]   This description, applicable both to typewriters and to more recent models, described many important advantages of the typewriter. Unfortunately for Pratt, by the time he had been granted an American patent for his Pterotype, Charles Latham Sholes had already been granted a patent for his typing machine. Because of this difference in timing, Sholess model became much more well-known in America and far overshadowed the Pterotype.  [12]   Charles Latham Sholes is usually known by most as the inventor of the first typewriter.  [13]  While this is not true, the Sholes-Glidden typewriter Sholes would later invent was indeed the first truly successful typewriter. Sholes lived near a local machine shop, the Kleinsteuber, and would often visit it with his friends Samuel W. Soule and Carlos Glidden. In July 1867, Sholes came across the article in Scientific America describing Pratts Pterotype. Inspired by this Type Writing Machine, Sholes set out to make his own machine, arguing that Pratts machine was too complex.  [14]  Through a great deal of experimenting and inventing, Sholes and his friends were finally able to make a machine that was able to print one letter: W.  [15]  For Sholes and his friends, this was a monumental achievement, and one that really spurred them on to continue with their work. With one letter under their metaphorical belts, Sholes, Soule, and Glidden continued to develop their typing machine until it was capable of typing the entire English alphabet. The first prototype of this typewriter was shaped almost exactly like a piano, with white and black keys made of ivory and ebony, respectively.  [16]  They named their new typewriting machine the Type-Writer after the title of the article that had originally inspired them.  [17]  Sholes knew that without money, their new machine was not going anywhere no matter how revolutionary it was. Sholes decided to contact people for support, and so began writing investors (with their new Type-Writer, of course). One of the investors, James Densmore, was very interested in Sholess writing machine. In order to seal his position, James readily paid them the hefty six-hundred dollars they had asked for in return for a portion of the company. He also stayed with the project, constantly pushing Soles to create the per fect machine.  [18]  While Densmore was infallibly confident in the typing machine, saying of the typewriter (a name he had created), I belive in the invention from the top-most corner of my hat to the bottom-most head of the nails of my boot heels, Sholes was not as confident in the machine he had invented, and sold it to Densmore. In 1872, his friend, Yost, visited him in Milwaukee and recommended to him the factory of E. Remington Son, a factory that had manufactured guns and sewing machines prior the end of the Civil War. In 1873 a deal was made to remodel the machine for manufacturing, and the factory set to work creating 1,000 typewriters-1,000 Type-Writers that revolutionized the world of writing and began the industry of the typewriter.  [19]   The biggest feature of the Sholes-Glidden typewriter was that one could finally type faster on it than one could write with a pen.  [20]  The first production Sholes-Glidden typewriters appearance was very different from that of more modern typewriters-it was shaped like a sewing machine (the Remington Arms Company had manufactured sewing machines and guns during the war.) However, the real legacy that the Sholes-Gldden typewriter has left us is not its sewing-machine like appearance, but rather its unique keyboard layout. As Sholes was creating his typewriter, he found a very annoying problem: when the keys were hit too quickly in succession, the hammers that printed characters would get jammed, tied up with each other. Sholes decided that the best way to resolve this problem would be to change the keyboard format to a more difficult one with keys commonly used together placed farther apart. Instead of the usual A-Z keyboard layout of its time, Sholes arranged his typewriter in the format everyone is well-versed in today, the QWERTY keyboard layout in order to prevent excessive jams.  [21]  As the popularity and success of Sholess typewriter grew and people began to adapt to its new keyboard layout, other companies saw the QWERTY layouts success and followed suit. Today, nearly every keyboard is created in the QWERTY layout-a beautiful showcase of the Sholes-Glidden typewriters lasting impact. Created by James B. Hammond, the Hammond model typewriter surfaced shortly after Sholess typewriter was released. Seeing the terrible misfortune Pratt had in the timing of his patent, Hammond offered Pratt a large sum of money as well as a percentage of the profits if Pratt consented to leaving the typewriter industry.  [22]  Then, taking Pratts plans and patents, Hammond created a typewriter that utilized the revolutionary idea of interchangeable type, or the shift button on todays keyboards.  [23]  This new mechanism allowed for two sets of keys on each hammer that could be swapped at the push of a button, allowing for typists to type with a far greater range of symbols and letters despite having a smaller amount of visible keys on the surface. Due to a general misunderstanding of what a typewriter was, the Sholes-Glidden typewriter did not sell very well when it was first released. People often confused the typewriter with the age-old printing press, not realizing that the typewriter was a brand-new revolutionary invention. When people began to understand the advantages of the typewriter, however, society was changed for the better in incredible ways. Typewriters unrivaled speed in producing text became necessities for both priests and clergymen, who were now able to type up sermons and record purchases in half of the time. Despite the typewriters learning curve, everybody recognized that typewriters had much potential, as evidenced by Mark Twains letter to his own typewriter: I AM TRYING TTO GET THE HANG OF THIS NEW FFANGLED WRITING MACHINE, BUT AM NOT MAKING A SHINING SUCCESS OF IT. HOWEVER THIS IS THE FIRST ATTEMPT I EVER HAVE MADE YET I PERCEIVETHAT I SHALL SOON EASILY ACQUIRE A FINE FACILITY IN ITS USE.  [24]   The aforementioned piece in Scientific American wrote that [l]egal copying, and the writing and delivering of sermons and lectures, not to speak of letters and editorials, will undergo a revolution as remarkable as that effected in books by the invention of printing.  [25]  Everyone, no matter what occupation or hobby, was benefited in one way or another. New conveniences previously un-thought of became realities, too, as evidenced by the letters one could have typed and printed for less than a dollar.  [26]  Even with these improvements typewriters brought to life, however, many still objected to many of the typewriters uses. One prominent example would be that of typing letters-when the typewriter was first released to the public, people would be offended if they received a typed letter, thinking that the sender did not care enough about them to hand-write the letter. Even so, though, it simply could not go unnoticed that the typewriter had begun to seep into every part of peoples lives, and generally improving that persons life as well. Not only did they improve everyday life and increase workflow, typewriters created many new opportunities for women. Because of the typewriters ever-growing popularity in the late 1800s, women were given a new opportunity to enter business.  [27]  While women used to be limited to working in factories and sweatshops, factories with terrible and inhumane conditions, typewriters gave them new opportunities for clerical work, which usually provided higher pay in better working conditions.  [28]  Sholes himself soon acknowledged himself that his typewriter provided women with new freedoms, saying, I do feel I have done something for the women who have always had to work so hard. This will enable them more easily to earn a livingà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦whatever I may have felt in the early days of the value of the typewriter, it is obviously a blessing to mankind, and especially to womankind.  [29]  Sholes must certainly have felt very surprised at all of the changes his typewriter bro ught. No matter who his original target demographic was, his Type-Writer gave thousands of women new lives and new conditions, all the while affording them a springboard from which they could jump to even higher positions in society later on.  [30]   The typewriter is one of the most revolutionary inventions in history. It brought speed to writers, productivity to offices, and convenience to workers. It brought jobs to women, letters to friends, and computers to people. While the journey in the creation of the typewriter was a long and arduous one, it was a very necessary one. It was created over centuries of work by countless people, people from inventors who improved upon the typewriter to investors who poured their heart and money into these machines. From writers who gave typewriters the public attention they needed to grow to hobbyists whose inventions led to a more versatile machine, each man adding onto the previous mans work. After a long voyage, the typewriter finally met its purpose as it made its way into the lives of every man and woman. Today, everyone uses a keyboard of some sort. Nearly every one of those keyboards is formatted in Sholess QWERTY layout, and every one of those keyboards includes Hammonds shift key. The type-writing machine, though very much forgotten today, still lives in nearly everything man-made, from the keyboards on our laptops to the text on our magazines produced by type-writing machines all around the world.

3g :: essays research papers

Verizon Wireless at the show launched Vcast, a consumer-focused multimedia service that will run on its 3G EvDO network. Vcast will let consumers access video, games and music on 3G handsets. Among the new, so-called next- generation phones touted at the show was Samsung's i730 handset, which supports 3G 1xEvDO data. Packed into the device, which runs Windows Mobile 2003 Second Edition for Pocket PC, is a slide-out QWERTY keyboard, 64MB of RAM for applications and an SDIO (SD input/output) memory card slot for expansion, built-in Wi-Fi and Bluetooth connectivity, a 2.8-inch QVGA 65K color display, and a speakerphone. The i730 will ship in the first quarter from Verizon, said sources. Pricing is not yet available. Also at the show, BenQ America Corp. showcased its forthcoming PalmOne Inc. Treo look-alike, the BenQ P50 Pocket PC smart phone. The quadband GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) phone has built-in Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, a 2.8-inch color screen, a 1.3-megapixel camera, a built-in keypad, 64MB of memory and an SDIO expansion slot, and a speakerphone. The P50 will ship next quarter. Pricing and carrier have not yet been determined. New 3G phones weren't the only gadgets on display at the CES that could prove compelling to business users. Another new Samsung phone, the SPH-A800, includes a 2-megapixel camera and scanner capabilities that let a user scan a business card and automatically upload contact information to the phone. The SPH-A800 will be offered from Sprint this quarter. Pricing is not yet available. Samsung at the show also unveiled a handset for users who like the nonintrusiveness of sending text messages but abhor the tediousness of keying in messages. The p207 lets users verbally address, compose and send SMS (Short Message Service) messages or e-mail. The p207 is due in March through Cingular Wireless. Pricing is not yet available. Mobile business professionals got a glimpse into their future last week at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas, where faster third-generation networks—and the gear designed to work with them—suggested a world of fewer dropped calls, improved Internet access, better image quality and lower prices. ADVERTISEMENT To fulfill such promises, carriers will be making significant improvements to their networks in the coming year. Verizon Wireless at the show announced it was expanding its 3G EvDO (Evolution Data Optimized) network to 12 more cities, with plans to further extend the network this year to cover 150 million users.

Analysis of Oxygen Bearing Compunds

Analysis of Oxygen bearing Organic compounds Abstract The Unknown sample in the experiment can be tested to yield results such as 1 ° (primary), 2 ° (secondary), 3 ° (tertiary) alcohols. Tests such as the dichromate test, Tollen’s test, Lucas test, DNPH test and iodoform test would be very useful in determining the type of alcohol that the unknown sample belongs to. In the experiment, the unknown sample underwent series of testing to identify what property of alcohol it belonged to and the result was that it was a primary alcohol. It went through the Dichromate reaction, Tollen’s reaction and finally the Lucas reaction. Introduction â€Å"The analysis of oxygen bearing organic compounds† is an experiment in which a variety of tests are available to identify a compound’s property whether it is a primary, secondary or tertiary alcohol. The tests that are included to come up with such results are interconnected with one another like that of the Dichromate test, followed by the Tollen’s test to yield an aldehyde if positive for mirror coating. The second set of procedure would again start with The Dichromate test, followed by the Tollen’s test and finally the Lucas test to yield either primary alcohol if it became turbid or secondary alcohols as it’s result if it did not turn turbid. The last set of interconnected tests were that of again, the Dichromate test, Followed by the DNPH that would determine if the unknown sample is a Ketone (positive for red-orange precipitate) or a tertiary alcohol (if negative for red-orange precipitate). But before going deeper on what these tests are, what first are the difference between their results which are the primary, secondary and the tertiary alcohols, aldehydes and ketones? Alcohols are compounds in which one or more hydrogen atoms in an alkane have been replaced by an -OH group. Note however that there are different kinds of alcohols and Alcohols are categorized into different classes depending on how the -OH group is positioned and arranged on the chain of the carbon atoms. Chemical differences between the various types are possible. First to be discussed would be the Primary (1 °) alcohol, in which the carbon carrying the -OH group is only attached to one alkyl group. Meanwhile, In a secondary (2 °) alcohol, the carbon with the -OH group attached is joined precisely to two alkyl groups, these alkyl groups that are attached to the carbon chain may be the same or different. In a tertiary (3 °) alcohol, the carbon atom holding the -OH group is attached directly to three alkyl groups, which may be any combination of same or different [1]. On the other hand, another result that can occur would be the presence of ketones and Aldehydes. But again, to understand the experiment further, what are Ketones and aldehydes? A ketone can be characterized as either the functional group categorized by a carbonyl group (O=C) attached to two other carbon atoms or it can be identified as a chemical compound that contains a carbonyl group. A carbonyl carbon bonded to two carbon atoms makes ketones different from carboxylic acids, aldehydes, esters, amides, and other oxygen-containing compounds. The double-bond of the carbonyl group distinguishes ketones from alcohols and ethers. The simplest ketone known is acetone [2]. Lastly among the results is the aldehyde. The term aldehyde seems to have arisen from the wordds alcohol dehydrogenated. Way back in earlier times, aldehydes were at times named after the corresponding alcohols, for example, vinous aldehyde for acetaldehyde. (Vinous is from Latin vinum = wine, the traditional source of ethanol; compare vinyl. ). An aldehyde is an example of an organic compound which has a terminal carbonyl group. This functional group, which consists of a carbon atom bonded to a hydrogen atom and double-bonded to an oxygen atom (chemical formula O=CH-), is commonly called the aldehyde group. The other names for aldehyde group are formyl and methanoyl group. The aldehyde group is considered polar. Oxygen, which is more electronegative than carbon, pulls the electrons in the carbon-oxygen bond in the direction of itself, creating an electron deficiency at the carbon atom. Owing to resonance stabilization of the conjugate base, an ? -hydrogen in an aldehyde is more acidic than a hydrogen atom in an alkane, with a typical pKa of 17 [3]. Results and discussions The experiment included parallel testing of 3 liquids that would be used for comparison. the first sample would be the unknown sample, the second would be the positive standard in which formaldehyde was used and the last wold be the negative sample in which the simplest ketone, Acetone was used. Only three test were used to determine whether the group’s unknown sample was under the category of primary, secondary, tertiary alcohol, aldehydes or ketones. The three tests were done one after the other in this order: Dichromate test, Tollen’s test, and Lucas test respectively. In the Dichromate test, the unknown sample and the formaldehyde turned green meaning that dichromate oxidized the primary alcohol, secondary alcohol, and aldehydes to ketones or carboxylic acids. Samples turning green would be an indicator that the samples are positive for oxidation and therefore are oxidizable. On the other hand, the acetone remained orange which means that it is not oxidizable and can be further continued to another test, the DPNH test which would prove that it is categorized as a ketone because of the presence of a red-orange precipitate that indicates that the DPNH reagent condenses with the carbonyl containing molecules. The second test that followed the Dichromate test was the Tollen’s test. In this test, the unknown sample turned clear gray and the formaldehyde turned into a dark grey liquid with silver streaks. The silver streaks are similar with the silver mirror coat that means that the Tollen’s reagent oxidized the ammonium salts of the carboxylic acids with this, the formaldehyde was categorized as an aldehyde. Alternatively, The clear grey liquid of the unknown sample would indicate that it was not positive for the Tollen’s test and therefore it would need to continue to be tested so as to decipher if it is a primary or secondary alcohol. The last test would be the Lucas test in which the unknown sample did not turn turbid and therefore it was concluded to be a primary alcohol. Together with the unknown sample that did not turn turbid was isopropyl and MeOH which just remained as clear liquids. then again, the sample liquid that turned turbid was the tertbutyl. By this reaction, it is said that alcohols are converted to alkyl chlorides with ZnCl2 taking into consideration too that different alcohol types respond at different rates with ZnCl2. Table 1. Chemical Test |Unknown sample |Standard (+) |Standard(-) | |Dichromate |*unknown sample turned green |*formaldehyde turned green meaning |*Acetone remained orange meaning it| | |meaning it it oxidizable |it is oxidizable |is not oxidizable | |Tollen’s |*unknown sample turned clear gray |*formaldehyde turned dark gray with|*acetone turned very light grey | | | |silver streaks. then turned clear. | |Lucas |*unknown sample did not turn turbid|*Tertbutyl-turned turbid fast |*Acetone- Clear; already not | | | |*Isopropyl-clear |applicable since it is a ketone. | | | |*MeOH-clear | | Experimentation A. An unknown sample was given and it should be parallel tested with two other standards- one would be positive and one would be negative. B. The Dichromate test started the experiment. 8 drops of the unknown sample as well as the the two other standard- formaldehyde and Acetone was placed in separate test tubes addind 2 drops of of 10% K2Cr2O7 and 5 drops of 6M H2SO4. C. The Tollen’s test followed. 2 ml of freshly made Tollen’s reagent and 5 droops of the unknown sample were mixed. After 5 minutes and the silver precipitate did not form yet, it was placed in a 70 degree water bath for another 5 minutes. Then the results were observed. D. The last test was the Lucas test in which the iunknown sample, tertbutyl, isopropyl and MeOH was tested all at the same time. 5 drops of the sample was and 15 drops of concentrated HCl was mixed together with a â€Å"corn grain† amount of ZnCl2 solid and the appearance of turbidity was observed or not. Conclusion: It can be concluded that the unknown sample that was given to be tested was an oxidizable, primary alcohol based on the tests that were conducted. Since it was positive for the dichromate test, it was deemed to be oxidizable. In the Tolle’s test, as it did not produce a mirror coat, it was directed to the choice of being a primary or a secondary alcohol. And for the last test, the Lucas test, it was finally concluded that it was a primary alcohol since it did not turn turbid. References: Books: †¢ Timberlake, Karen C. , â€Å"General, Organic, and Biological Chemistry Structures of Life,Platinum Edition†, Pearson Education, Inc. , 2004 †¢ Bettelheim, F. A. , [et al. ], â€Å"Introduction to organic and biochemistry. 6th ed. †? Belmont, CA : Brooks/Cole, c2007 †¢ Wade, L. G. , . â€Å"Organic chemistry 6th ed. †. Upper Saddle River, N. J. : Pearson Prentice Hall, c2006. Additional On-line sources: †¢ [1] Clarks, j. (2003). Alcohol oxidation. Retrieved September 8 2008 from http://www. chemguide. co. uk/organicprops/alcohols/oxidation. html †¢ [2] N. A, (24 August 2008). Ketones. Wikipedia ®. Retrieved September 8 2008 from http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Ketones †¢ †¢ [3] N. A, (31 August 2008). Aldehydes. Wikipedia ®. Retrieved September 8 2008 from http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Aldehydes

Nelson Mandelas Inauguration Speech Analysis Essay Example

Nelson Mandelas Inauguration Speech Analysis Essay Example Nelson Mandelas Inauguration Speech Analysis Paper Nelson Mandelas Inauguration Speech Analysis Paper Inaugural Speech by Nelson Mandela Nelson Mandelas inauguration speech held major significance in many ways due mainly to the fact that before becoming the first black president of South Africa, he had spent decades fighting against apartheid and enduring 22 years of prison. This speech was presented in order to signify a new era and a new page in the history of South Africa. Every word and sentence was carefully chosen in order to serve a specific purpose and address different audiences both within South Africa and to the world. What is the purpose of Mandelas speech? The purpose of Mandelas speech was not simply to address the nation as their new president and give gratitude to those who put him there but instead to make a statement that South Africa was going to make immense changes and unify to show the world what the nation could truly do in order to become a land of hope, freedom, justice and equality for all. Throughout the speech, Mandela very carefully and specifically uses both ethos and pathos in order to draw out many different emotions and encourage the nation to feel unified and prepared to make the necessary changes to overcome and rectify the deeply rooted problems which South Africans faced for all too long. Mandela, being a well-known figure in South Africa long before becoming president, had a strong established credibility within the black community. Mandela was known for working and leading in the African National Congress (ANC) and enduring years in prison for his cause, therefore people had faith and respect for him and many looked at him almost as if he were family to them, thus gaining the nickname of grandfather to many. When addressing the nation, not only were people willing to listen intently, but they also truly believed he would follow through on his words and not make empty promises. His past actions helped prove him as a worthy candidate and instilled trust with in the black citizens of South Africa. It was important that Mandela also address the white citizens of South Africa carefully in order to unite them together instead of continuing the division. Outside of South Africa, many had also heard of his achievements and work and knowing so helped Mandela structure his speech to carefully address the needs of all audiences. Of all the audiences the speech was directed to, his fellow black South Africans were the first and foremost. Addressing the emotional needs of this group was highly important and Mandela spoke regarding what they needed to hear most: change for the better and unity. He brought up feelings of anger in remembering the past mistreatment because along with anger comes a strong motivation for change and a call to action. He spoke of specific and achievable goals, which brought forth a longing and eagerness of the community to achieve these goals. He spoke of obligation, both to themselves and to the world to make their nation just, strengthened and confident enough to sustain all hopes of a glorious life. All this we owe both to ourselves and to the people of the world who are so well represented here today. By saying this, Mandela made the people of South Africa feel an urgency and responsibility to act and prove themselves to the rest of the world and also made sure that citizens of the world who were watching South Africa would make sure they were held accountable to their word. He gave South Africans a sense of pride for putting up a fight and not giving up their dreams of change, for being able to put up with so much and still come out strong and optimistic for a brighter future instead of resentful and eager for revenge. The time for the healing of the wounds has come, the moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come Mandela was also able to make an immediate call to action and a necessity to act as quickly as possible. One of the most important emotions that Mandela successfully created within the people through his speech though was the feeling of hope; hope for a better future, a unified nation, better opportunities for both themselves and future generations and hope that all the changes were absolutely possible as long as they joined together to work towards these goals. Another important audience Mandela was speaking to was the white South Africans. It was very important to address the needs of this particular group because they had been in power for decades and were feeling nervous anticipation about the immense changes in process. Mandela made sure to present his message very carefully in order to not bring up feelings of rebellion, resentment or retaliation. His goal was not to attack them and force them to pay for past actions, but instead to understand and join together in making changes for a better future for all citizens regardless of color. We shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world. He spoke carefully about the sufferings of the past so the whites could understand why change was so necessary. A feeling of guilt and shame in this group was important so they would be willing to make changes. There was also a sense of obligation within this audience to help prove to the world that they were willing to move forward and take a hand in helping to re-build South Africa. There was guilt in past actions, because regardless of the fact that Mandela did not point blame at anyone, the world had known about the problems and causes of the problems. The pain we all carried in our hearts as we saw our country tear itself apart in a terrible conflict. Hope and optimism were emotions that Mandela hoped the audience would feel as his speech came to a close. By speaking of unity, justice, peace and freedom, he wanted the white community to join together into a multi-cultural nation that would from now on work collaboratively towards common goals in the best interests of all. One of the other groups of people Mandela was addressing in his speech were the citizens of the world. There were messages he wanted to share and feelings he wanted to bring forward within this community as well. For years, the world watched as South Africa tore itself apart in conflict, violate human rights and refuse to make changes and steps towards a new direction. It was vital that Mandela show the world how ready they really were now to make these changes. The world was to be both an audience and a judge that South Africans would prove themselves to. By sharing the changes and goals that South Africa hoped to achieve, a sense of obligation and a necessity to show the world what they could do would emerge. He shared feelings of sadness with the world when speaking of the past and a willingness to help South Africa to achieve their goals because these goals were to be achieved not only as a nation but also as citizens of humanity and the world. We thank all our distinguished international guests for having come to. A common victory for justice, for peace, for human dignity. There was also a feeling of pride within this community when Mandela addressed the gratitude he felt towards the heroes and heroines for helping in the fight towards change. By bringing up this sense of pride, Mandela knew it would also bring a sense of obligation to continue doing the right thing and continue to help South Africa along on its road to peace. With a wealth of experience, knowledge and leadership, Mandela knew very clearly how important a speech like this would be to summon up the right emotions and states of mind for citizens in South Africa and the world. Every word, sentence and paragraph addressed different issues, brought up various emotions and helped to give a feeling of unity and a longing for change. By effectively combining his use of ethos and pathos, Mandela was able to address numerous audiences within one speech and send forth a common message to all.

Free sample - Access to Law. translation missing

Access to Law. Access to LawFreedom is not worth having if it does not connote freedom to err. It passes my comprehension how human beings, be they so ever experienced and able can delight in depriving other human beings of that precious right. You must not lose hope in humanity. Humanity is an ocean, if few drops of the ocean are dirty, the ocean does not become dirty. (Mahatma Gandhi). Throughout human history mighty voices indeed have emerged to grace and offer fulfillment and hope to those struggling under the yoke of suppression. Their legacies will shape and impact our lives for decades to come. If freedom means doing what we should rather than to do whatever we want, who decides what we should do and does any man have the right to impose that on others? (Pope John Paul) There is no point in one having freedom if it fails to represent freedom for all in an equal manner. How is it that people are ever so clever, yet enjoy taking away another’s right? You should not lose hope in the human race, as there are so many of us and we are not all the same. We are like a bag of apples; picking one bad apple from the bag does not mean that they are all bad. Throughout history, there have been many role models who have fought for equality and hope for many deprived people. They have become legends and have had a strong impact on many people’s lives today. Could it be that we as humans have never been allowed to experience freedom without sacrificing the little that we contain. Initially I will look at Gandhi the Mahatma and analyze a bit of his history and the impact he has on the nation today. Further, I will be analyzing ones freedom and entitlement to it. Lastly I will give my views on being allowed to exercise their personal rights. Regarded as the father of hope, Gandhi the Mahatma is one of the most celebrated individuals who have played a major role in the fight for the less fortunate and minority in the society, giving inspiration by his words of wisdom and actions alike, Brown( 2001, P. 22) Wolpert ( 2004,p. 43). He was among the few respectable individuals who walked the talk. Though born in a wealthy Hindu family, Mahatma Gandhi lowered himself from the glory status that his birthright had placed on him to the â€Å"grass† level where the majority of the people occupied. He played a major role in advocating for the rights of the less fortunate in the society and he participated in war without any weaponry but with his words full of wisdom and people empowerment. One of his famous quotes relates with his general perception and believes on humanity. He presented his argument in the context of freedom. He famously said, â€Å"Freedom is not worth having if it does not connote freedom to err. It passes my comprehension how human beings, be they so ever experienced and able can delight in depriving other human beings of that precious right. You must not lose hope in humanity. Humanity is an ocean, if few drops of the ocean are dirty, the ocean does not become dirty† Erikson (2005, p. 77) Chadha (2007, 90). This is a question that one would ask, is everyone entitled to freedom? And what is freedom. Freedom can be looked at in various perspectives. Fundamentally we see that the system is designed in such a way that it segregates against others either based on their skin color or race and ethnicity, their position in society, religion, gender, age, and any other variable that a socio-economist might take into account when analyzing the social status of individuals. Here we see people expected to act and live in a given lifestyle that is acceptable to the given system or the code of conduct that governs a given society of community. Such defined code of operations clearly embeds mechanisms of dealing with cases of deviation from the norm. The argument of existence of freedom is one of the most debatable concepts in human life. We witness cases where the systems have very stringent rules such that people’s options are so limited such that whenever one does something considered to be out of the norm he or she is punished or sometimes expelled from the system. Most people have died as a result of doing things against the rules or code of ethics defined in any given system such incidences can really bring the question into further scrutiny on whether really freedom exists. I believe people should be allowed to exercise their personal rights and do what they want to do as long as the repercussions are within their area of jurisdiction. Such acts will lead to people learning from others mistakes and also device a mechanism of overcoming such challenges. It will be essential for every system to be open in such a way that the members are allowed to always challenge the status quo and also be able to positively criticize where possible. Existences of closed systems have promoted suffering among many members of the society and such acts have to be condemned. The legacies of the heroes like Mahatma Gandhi and many other advocates of human life is the living example that drives us to the believe that any system should be able to allow the citizens to exercise their right and thus the need for the creation of the fundamental environment that allows people to freely live whenever they want, however they want and with whoever they want as long as the choices do no breach other people’s freedom. Reference Brown, Judith M. Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. Chadha, Yogesh. Gandhi: A Life. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2007. Erikson, Erik. H. Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence. New York: Norton, 2009. Wolpert, Stanely. Gandhi’s Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.